Calif. Bear Dispatch
Capitola Bureau 95010
The Barn
24 May 2025
To. Media TBA
Fm. Hayes, Field Correspondent, Monsoon Beach
Subj. ICBM Alert--Golden Dome: Range, Trajectory Intercept-- Russia, China Combined Action Report
Russia and China ICBM Organizational Data and Launch Locations
A. Russia
1. Organizational Structure:
a. Russia’s land-based ICBMs are controlled by the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), a separate branch of the Russian Armed Forces responsible for the command and operation of all ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.
b. The RVSN headquarters is in Kuntsevo, Moscow, with an alternate command post at Kosvinsky Mountain in the Urals.
2. ICBM Inventory and Types:
a. As of 2024, Russia fields approximately 286 ICBMs capable of delivering 958 nuclear warheads.
b. The main missile systems include:
(1) R-36M2 (SS-18) – Silo-based
(2) UR-100N (SS-19) – Silo-based
(3) RT-2UTTH Topol-M (SS-27) – Silo and mobile-based
(4) RS-24 Yars – Mobile and silo-based, MIRVed
(5) RS-28 Sarmat – New super-heavy ICBM entering service, silo-based.
2. Deployment and Launch Locations:
a. Russian ICBM silos and mobile launchers are distributed across several military districts, with key missile bases and regiments spread throughout central and eastern Russia.
b. Notable locations include:
Kuntsevo (command post)
Kosvinsky Mountain (alternate command post)
Missile fields and regimental bases in the Central, Eastern, and Southern Military Districts
Kura Test Range in the Far East for missile testing
B. China
1. Organizational Structure:
b. China’s ICBMs are operated by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which oversees all of China’s strategic missile forces, including both nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles.
b. ICBM Inventory and Types:
(1) China is rapidly modernizing and expanding its ICBM arsenal. Key systems include:
(2) DF-5 (silo-based, liquid-fueled)
(3) DF-31/DF-31A/DF-31AG (road-mobile, solid-fueled)
DF-41 (road-mobile and silo-based, MIRVed)
(4) Estimated warheads: Over 500 as of 2024, with projections of up to 1,500 by 2035 if current trends continue
2. Deployment and Launch Locations:
a. China is undergoing the largest missile silo expansion in its history, with major new silo fields under construction:
(1) Yumen (Gansu Province): ~120 new silos
(2) Hami (Eastern Xinjiang): ~110 new silos, 380 km northwest of Yumen
(3) Jilantai (Inner Mongolia): ~12 silos
(4) Additional silos in older DF-5 deployment areas
(5) PLARF also operates over 100 road-mobile ICBM launchers at more than a dozen bases across China
b. “The number of new Chinese silos under construction exceeds the number of silo-based ICBMs operated by Russia, and constitutes more than half of the size of the entire US ICBM force.”
3. Key Trends
a. Russia maintains the world’s largest deployed nuclear arsenal and continues to modernize its ICBM forces, with both silo and mobile launchers distributed across the country.
b. China is rapidly expanding its ICBM force, especially silo-based missiles, with the Yumen and Hami silo fields representing the most significant increase in Chinese nuclear capability to date.
c. Both countries are investing in MIRVed missiles and enhancing survivability through mobility and hardened silos.
PART II. NARRATIVE SUMMARY
1. Technological and Doctrinal Adaptations
a. Both countries are already investing heavily in systems that can evade or saturate missile defenses:
(1) China is rapidly expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal, fielding hypersonic glide vehicles (e.g., DF-27) and fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) that can maneuver unpredictably and approach the U.S. from unconventional trajectories, making interception by missile defense systems far more difficult.
(2) Russia is deploying a suite of "super weapons," including the RS-28 Sarmat ICBM (capable of a South Pole trajectory to bypass northern hemisphere defenses), the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, and even nuclear-armed underwater drones like the Status-6.
(3) Russia is also reportedly exploring the deployment of warheads in orbit, which further complicates defense planning.
2. Strategic Collaboration and Mutual Reinforcement
a. While China and Russia stop short of a formal military alliance, their strategic partnership is deepening across economic, technological, and military domains.
b. Both countries coordinate closely on multilateral platforms (UN, SCO, BRICS), presenting a united front against what they perceive as Western attempts to contain or divide them.
c. Their collaboration extends to sharing technology, intelligence, and possibly even joint development of countermeasures to U.S. missile defense initiatives.
3. Implications for Arms Racing and Global Stability
a. The Golden Dome initiative is likely to accelerate an arms race in both offensive and counter-space capabilities.
b. Historically, it has been cheaper and faster to build new offensive systems that can bypass missile defenses than to develop and deploy effective interceptors. c. The prospect of a robust U.S. missile shield incentivizes China and Russia to proliferate novel delivery systems, increase warhead numbers, and develop space-based or orbital weapons, all of which erode strategic predictability and raise the risk of crisis instability.
4. Conclusion
a. The U.S. Golden Dome proposal is catalyzing a new phase in the strategic competition among major powers.
b. Russia and China are already well underway in developing and fielding advanced systems to bypass such defenses, and their partnership—rooted in mutual strategic necessity and reinforced by economic and diplomatic ties—ensures that efforts to counter the Golden Dome will be persistent, adaptive, and increasingly sophisticated.
c. The result is a more complex and potentially unstable global security environment, with a heightened risk of arms racing in both nuclear and space domains.
PART III. TECHNICAL ASPECTS
1. Theoretical Range of Chinese and Russian Nuclear-Armed ICBMs
a. Russia's R-36M (SS-18 Satan) is the world's longest-range ICBM, with a maximum range of 16,000 km.
b. China's Dongfeng-41 (DF-41) has a range of between 12,000 km and 15,000 km.
c. These ranges allow both countries to target virtually any location on Earth from their own territory.
2. Golden Dome Strategic Defense Initiative:
a. Interception Capabilities
(1) The proposed "Golden Dome" is a multilayered missile defense system, incorporating ground- and space-based sensors and interceptors, with the intent to intercept missiles at every phase: pre-launch, boost, midcourse, and terminal.
(2) The system is designed to expand on current U.S. missile defense, aiming to defend against not just rogue states but also major nuclear powers like Russia and China.
(3) However, experts note that Golden Dome is not intended to be impenetrable; it is largely aimed at deterring or defeating small-scale attacks, not massive barrages from near-peer adversaries.
(4) Defending against the large numbers and advanced countermeasures (e.g., decoys, MIRVs, hypersonic glide vehicles) of Russian and Chinese ICBMs would require a vast and likely unfeasible number of interceptors and satellites.
3. How Far Could an ICBM Travel Before Interception?
a. The interception of an ICBM depends on the phase of its flight:
(1) Boost Phase:
(i) Intercepting during the first 3–5 minutes after launch, while the missile is still accelerating and most vulnerable.
(ii) This requires interceptors to be very close to the launch site, which is not feasible for Russia or China due to geography and warning time.
(2)
Midcourse Phase:
(i) The missile coasts through space for up to 20–25 minutes, covering most of its range.
(ii) Space-based interceptors could, in theory, engage here, but the vast area and countermeasures make this extremely challenging.
(3) Terminal Phase:
(1) The warhead re-enters the atmosphere in the final minute or so before impact.
(ii) Defenses here are the last line and are even less effective against MIRVs and decoys.
(iii) Given the current and proposed capabilities, a Chinese or Russian ICBM could, in theory, travel its full intercontinental range (12,000–16,000 km) before interception is attempted, with the most likely engagement occurring during the midcourse or terminal phase.
4. Practical Effectiveness and Limitations
a. Experts widely agree that, even with advanced systems like Golden Dome, intercepting a large-scale ICBM attack from Russia or China is technologically and logistically implausible with current or near-future technology.
b. The defense may be effective against a small number of incoming missiles, but a full-scale barrage would likely overwhelm it.
c. The existence of such a system could prompt adversaries to develop new delivery methods (e.g., hypersonic weapons, orbital bombardment, nuclear-armed drones) specifically designed to evade or saturate defenses.
5. Conclusion
A Chinese or Russian nuclear-armed ICBM could theoretically travel its full intercontinental range (up to 16,000 km) before being intercepted by the proposed Golden Dome system.
a. The most likely interception attempt would occur in the midcourse or terminal phase, but the odds of successful interception against a large-scale attack remain very low due to technical, logistical, and strategic limitations.
PART IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS
1. International Response to the Proposed U.S. Golden Dome Strategic Defense Initiative
a. The announcement of the U.S. "Golden Dome" missile defense initiative has triggered significant international concern and criticism, particularly from major space and military powers.
b. China's Response
(1) China has been vocal in its opposition, expressing "serious concern" over the Golden Dome project.
(2) The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the plan for its "strong offensive implications" and warned that it would increase the risks of space militarization and a global arms race.
(3) Beijing argued that the deployment of orbital interceptor systems would violate the principle of the peaceful use of outer space as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty, and urged the U.S. to halt development to preserve global strategic stability.
c. Russia's Response
(1) Russia has also condemned the initiative, warning that it could trigger a new arms race and force Moscow to allocate more resources to its strategic forces.
(2) Russian officials indicated that the Golden Dome may necessitate renewed discussions on nuclear arms regulation between Moscow and Washington.
d. A joint statement by Russia and China denounced the project for undermining the balance between strategic offensive and defensive arms, a principle central to global strategic stability.
2. Concerns Over Arms Race and Space Militarization
a. Both China and Russia see the Golden Dome as a direct threat to the current arms control regime and the peaceful use of outer space.
b. Experts warn that the initiative could incentivize other nations to develop similar or more advanced weapons to bypass the U.S. missile defense network, potentially igniting an arms race in space.
c. The project is viewed as a revival of the Cold War-era Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars," which was never fully realized due to technological, financial, and treaty-related challenges.
3. Allied and Partner Reactions
a. The U.S. has indicated that the Golden Dome will involve cooperation with allies, with Canada cited as a potential first partner.
b. The executive order establishing the initiative calls for increased bilateral and multilateral cooperation on missile defense technology and operations, suggesting the U.S. will seek to offset some political costs of a reduced troop presence abroad through enhanced missile defense partnerships.
PART V. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. Comparison Table: Russia vs. China ICBM Forces
| Category | Russia | China |
|---|---|---|
| Command Structure | Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) | PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) |
| Total ICBMs (2024) | ~286 | ~100+ road-mobile, ~250 silos under construction |
| Warheads (2024) | ~1,550 deployed strategic, up to 2,000 non-strategic | 500+ (2024), projected 1,500 by 2035 |
| Main Missile Types | SS-18, SS-19, SS-27, RS-24, RS-28 | DF-5, DF-31, DF-41 |
| Silo Locations | Central/Eastern Russia, multiple bases | Yumen, Hami, Jilantai, others |
| Mobile Launchers | Yes (Topol-M, Yars) | Yes (DF-31, DF-41) |
2. Summary Table: ICBM Range vs. Interception
| Country | ICBM Model | Max Range (km) | Likely Intercept Phase | Probability of Intercept (Golden Dome) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russia | R-36M | 16,000 | Midcourse/Terminal | Low (large-scale attack) |
| China | DF-41 | 12,000–15,000 | Midcourse/Terminal | Low (large-scale attack) |
3. Summary Table: International Response
| Country/Bloc | Position on Golden Dome | Key Concerns/Actions |
|---|---|---|
| China | Strongly Opposed | Space militarization, arms race, violation of treaties |
| Russia | Strongly Opposed | Arms race, strategic stability, need for arms talks |
| U.S. Allies | Mixed/Cooperative | Potential for partnership, extended missile defense |
| Global Community | Widespread Concern | Destabilization, proliferation of space weapons |
4. Synthetic Intelligence Inquiries. Perplexity AI
5. Image. Lewiston Daily News, 07 November 1957, Page 1.
6. Report prepared by A. Hayes, Monsoon Beach 95010
End of Report
UNCLASSIFIED
No comments:
Post a Comment